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The urban survival camps they are setting up around the world are a bit more like showpieces, congresses and "beta" tests of ideas and behaviors the rest of us may soon be implementing in our communities, and in our own ways.

The occupiers are actually forging a robust micro-society of working groups, each one developing new approaches -- or reviving old approaches -- to long-running problems. In just one example, Occupy's General Assembly is a new, highly flexible approach to group discussion and consensus building. Unlike parliamentary rules that promote debate, difference and decision, the General Assembly forges consensus by "stacking" ideas and objections much in the fashion that computer programmers "stack" features.

The whole thing is orchestrated through simple hand gestures think commodities exchange. Elements in the stack are prioritized, and everyone gets a chance to speak. Even after votes, exceptions and objections are incorporated as amendments. This is just one reason why occupiers seem incompatible with current ideas about policy demands or right vs.

They are not interested in debate or what Enlightenment philosophers called " dialectic " but consensus. They are working to upgrade that binary, winner-takes-all, 13th century political operating system. And like any software developer, they are learning to "release early and release often. Likewise, occupiers have embraced the Internet access solutions of the Free Network Foundation, who have erected "Freedom Towers" at the Occupy sites in New York, Austin and elsewhere through which people can access free, uncensored, authenticated Wi-Fi.

As this technology scales to our own communities, what happens to corporate Internet service providers is anyone's guess. The occupiers have formed working groups to take on myriad social and economic issues, and their many occupation sites serve to test the approaches they come up with. One group is developing a complementary currency for use, initially, within the network of Occupy communities.

Its efficacy will be tested and strengthened by occupiers providing one another with goods and services before it is rolled out to the world at large. Another working group is pushing to have people withdraw their money from large corporate banks on November 5 and move it instead to local banks or cooperatively owned credit unions. Whether or not we agree that anything at all in modern society needs to be changed, we must at least come to understand that the occupiers are not just another political movement, nor are they simply lazy kids looking for an excuse not to work.

Rather, they see the futility of attempting to use the tools of a competitive, winner-takes-all society for purposes that might better be served through the tools of mutual aid. This is not a game that someone wins, but rather a form of play that is successful the more people get to play, and the longer the game is kept going.

They will succeed to the extent that the various models they are prototyping out on the pavement trickle up to those of us working on solutions from the comfort of our heated homes and offices. For as we come to embrace or even consider options such as local production and commerce, credit unions, unfettered access to communications technology and consensus-based democracy, we become occupiers ourselves.

The opinions expressed in this commentary are solely those of Douglas Rushkoff. TMNews - Michele Santoro ha lottato per anni per riavere il 'suo' microfono.

Prima puntata intitolata 'Scassare la casta', tra gli ospiti l'industriale Diego Della Valle. Santoro rivendica il risultato della raccolta fondi, prossima al milione di euro con oltre 93mila adesioni: Si candida a guida della "rivolta del pubblico televisivo", allo "sciopero del telecomando" contro "la tv che c'è e ci fa schifo".

Ricorda di non aver rinunciato alle sue ambizioni di rientro in Rai: Se qualcuno si aspetta un Santoro barricadero antiberlusconiano probabilmente non sarà deluso: Ma nella conferenza stampa il conduttore offre anche un assaggio della sua propensione tutt'altro che conciliante con i vertici del Pd: Noi ci saremo quando le faranno, non gliele faremo fare da soli ". Frecciata anche per Matteo Renzi: E per il futuro, se Silvio Berlusconi perde palazzo Chigi "per la Rai sarà un'opportunità", ma il rinnovamento, avverte, "non si fa con chi ha prodotto i reality.

O la sinistra quando tornerà al potere giustizierà il pensiero diverso? Renzi dice di avere cento idee nuove, gli diremo le nostre sulla tv In ogni caso, l'avversario che Santoro identifica in questo momento è "il sistema politico nel suo insieme, se vuole una tv che risponda al suo ordine pubblico: Il creatore di Samarcanda e di Annozero si dice sicuro che le rappresaglie dei partiti ci saranno: Siamo adulti e molte delle tv che stanno con noi si comporteranno da adulte".

Ma soprattutto, prevede, "se avremo successo succederanno delle cose in questi mesi nella tv ma anche nella politica italiana". E qui il pensiero corre alla scelta di De Magistris per la prima puntata: No single challenge has been greater for me as a leader than learning how to take better care of the people I lead, and to create a safe, supportive space in which they can thrive.

Like most men I know, I grew up with very little modeling around empathy — the ability to recognize, experience and be sensitive to what others are feeling. Empathy proved especially difficult for me whenever I felt vulnerable.

My instinctive response was to protect myself, most often with aggression. I equated aggression with safety, and vulnerability with weakness. Today, I recognize the opposite is often true.

The more I acknowledge my own fears and uncertainties, the safer people feel with me and the more effectively they work. But even now, I'm amazed at how dense I can sometimes be. An effective modern leader requires a blend of intellectual qualities — the ability to think analytically, strategically and creatively — and emotional ones, including self-awareness, empathy, and humility.

In short, great leadership begins with being a whole human being. I meet far more women with this blend of qualities than I do men, and especially so when it comes to emotional and social intelligence. To a significant degree, that's a reflection of limitations men almost inevitably develop in a culture that measures us by the ability to project strength and confidence, hide what we're feeling including from ourselves , and define who we are above all by our external accomplishments and our capacity to prevail over others.

The vast majority of CEOs and senior executives I've met over the past decade are men with just these limitations. Most of them resist introspection, feel more comfortable measuring outcomes than they do managing emotions, and under-appreciate the powerful connection between how people feel and how they perform.

I'm not suggesting gender ensures or precludes any specific qualities. I've met and hired men who are just as self-aware, authentic and capable of connection as any women. This is especially and encouragingly true among younger men. I've also encountered many senior women executives who've modeled themselves after male leaders, or perhaps felt they had to adopt their style to survive, and are just as narrow and emotionally limited as their worst male counterparts.

For the most part, however, women, more than men, bring to leadership a more complete range of the qualities modern leaders need, including self-awareness, emotional attunement, humility and authenticity.

That's scarcely just my own view. In March, Jack Zenger and Joseph Folkman reported here on their study of leaders who got rated by their peers, supervisors and direct reports. Women scored higher in 12 of 16 key skills — not just developing others, building relationships, collaborating, and practicing self development, but also taking initiative, driving for results and solving problems and analyzing issues. In another study of adults conducted by the PEW center, women were rated higher on a range of leadership qualities including honesty, intelligence, diligence, compassion and creativity.

For all that, women still hold only 14 percent of senior executive positions in Fortune companies, a percentage has barely budged over the last decade. So why do women remain so vastly underrepresented at the highest levels of large companies? There are many answers, including the fact that even the most educated women typically take the primary role in raising their children, and are far more likely than men to scale back their careers and ambitions, or even leave the workforce altogether.

But perhaps the key explanation is that men commonly bring more of one key capacity to the competition for senior leadership roles: The word aggression comes from The Latin root "ag" before and "gred" to walk or step. Aggression, therefore, connotes stepping before or in front of someone and it has an undeniably genetic component.

Men have in 7 to 8 times the concentration of testosterone in their blood plasma than women do. From an early age, men often overvalue their strengths, while women too frequently underrate theirs. In reality, we all struggle to feel a stable sense of value and self-worth. Men often defend against their doubts by moving to grandiosity and inflation, while women more frequently move to insecurity and deferral.

Men seek more often to win, women to connect. So long as the path to power is connected to proving you're bigger and badder, it's no surprise that men have mostly prevailed. But the leadership skills required to fuel great performance are far more nuanced and multi-dimensional today than ever before. As Hanna Rosin puts it in her new book The End of Men, "The post-industrial economy is indifferent to men's size and strength.

Instead, we need more male leaders with the courage to stand down, comfortably acknowledge their shortcomings, and help those they lead feel safe and appreciated rather than fearful and inadequate. We need more women with the courage to step up, fully own their strengths, and lead with confidence and resolve while also holding on to their humanity and their humility.

The population problem has no technical solution; it requires a fundamental extension in morality. At the end of a thoughtful article on the future of nuclear war, Wiesner and York 1 concluded that: It is our considered professional judgment that this dilemma has no technical solution. If the great powers continue to look for solutions in the area of science and technology only, the result will be to worsen the situation.

I would like to focus your attention not on the subject of the article national security in a nuclear world but on the kind of conclusion they reached, namely that there is no technical solution to the problem. An implicit and almost universal assumption of discussions published in professional and semipopular scientific journals is that the problem under discussion has a technical solution. A technical solution may be defined as one that requires a change only in the techniques of the natural sciences, demanding little or nothing in the way of change in human values or ideas of morality.

In our day though not in earlier times technical solutions are always welcome. Because of previous failures in prophecy, it takes courage to assert that a desired technical solution is not possible. Wiesner and York exhibited this courage; publishing in a science journal, they insisted that the solution to the problem was not to be found in the natural sciences.

They cautiously qualified their statement with the phrase, "It is our considered professional judgment Rather, the concern here is with the important concept of a class of human problems which can be called "no technical solution problems," and, more specifically, with the identification and discussion of one of these. It is easy to show that the class is not a null class. Recall the game of tick-tack-toe. Consider the problem, "How can I win the game of tick-tack-toe?

Put another way, there is no "technical solution" to the problem. I can win only by giving a radical meaning to the word "win. Every way in which I "win" involves, in some sense, an abandonment of the game, as we intuitively understand it. I can also, of course, openly abandon the game--refuse to play it. This is what most adults do.

The class of "No technical solution problems" has members. My thesis is that the "population problem," as conventionally conceived, is a member of this class. How it is conventionally conceived needs some comment. It is fair to say that most people who anguish over the population problem are trying to find a way to avoid the evils of overpopulation without relinquishing any of the privileges they now enjoy.

They think that farming the seas or developing new strains of wheat will solve the problem--technologically. I try to show here that the solution they seek cannot be found.

The population problem cannot be solved in a technical way, any more than can the problem of winning the game of tick-tack-toe. Population, as Malthus said, naturally tends to grow "geometrically," or, as we would now say, exponentially.

In a finite world this means that the per capita share of the world's goods must steadily decrease. Is ours a finite world? A fair defense can be put forward for the view that the world is infinite; or that we do not know that it is not.

But, in terms of the practical problems that we must face in the next few generations with the foreseeable technology, it is clear that we will greatly increase human misery if we do not, during the immediate future, assume that the world available to the terrestrial human population is finite. A finite world can support only a finite population; therefore, population growth must eventually equal zero. The case of perpetual wide fluctuations above and below zero is a trivial variant that need not be discussed.

When this condition is met, what will be the situation of mankind? Specifically, can Bentham's goal of "the greatest good for the greatest number" be realized? No --for two reasons, each sufficient by itself. The first is a theoretical one. It is not mathematically possible to maximize for two or more variables at the same time. This was clearly stated by von Neumann and Morgenstern 3 , but the principle is implicit in the theory of partial differential equations, dating back at least to D'Alembert The second reason springs directly from biological facts.

To live, any organism must have a source of energy for example, food. This energy is utilized for two purposes: For man, maintenance of life requires about kilocalories a day "maintenance calories".

Anything that he does over and above merely staying alive will be defined as work, and is supported by "work calories" which he takes in. Work calories are used not only for what we call work in common speech; they are also required for all forms of enjoyment, from swimming and automobile racing to playing music and writing poetry.

If our goal is to maximize population it is obvious what we must do: We must make the work calories per person approach as close to zero as possible. No gourmet meals, no vacations, no sports, no music, no literature, no art. I think that everyone will grant, without argument or proof, that maximizing population does not maximize goods. Bentham's goal is impossible. In reaching this conclusion I have made the usual assumption that it is the acquisition of energy that is the problem.

The appearance of atomic energy has led some to question this assumption. However, given an infinite source of energy, population growth still produces an inescapable problem.

The problem of the acquisition of energy is replaced by the problem of its dissipation, as J. Fremlin has so wittily shown 4. The arithmetic signs in the analysis are, as it were, reversed; but Bentham's goal is still unobtainable.

The optimum population is, then, less than the maximum. The difficulty of defining the optimum is enormous; so far as I know, no one has seriously tackled this problem. Reaching an acceptable and stable solution will surely require more than one generation of hard analytical work--and much persuasion. We want the maximum good per person; but what is good? To one person it is wilderness, to another it is ski lodges for thousands. To one it is estuaries to nourish ducks for hunters to shoot; to another it is factory land.

Comparing one good with another is, we usually say, impossible because goods are incommensurable. Incommensurables cannot be compared. Theoretically this may be true; but in real life incommensurables are commensurable. Only a criterion of judgment and a system of weighting are needed.

In nature the criterion is survival. Is it better for a species to be small and hideable, or large and powerful? Natural selection commensurates the incommensurables. The compromise achieved depends on a natural weighting of the values of the variables. Man must imitate this process. There is no doubt that in fact he already does, but unconsciously. It is when the hidden decisions are made explicit that the arguments begin. The problem for the years ahead is to work out an acceptable theory of weighting.

Synergistic effects, nonlinear variation, and difficulties in discounting the future make the intellectual problem difficult, but not in principle insoluble. Has any cultural group solved this practical problem at the present time, even on an intuitive level?

One simple fact proves that none has: Any people that has intuitively identified its optimum point will soon reach it, after which its growth rate becomes and remains zero.

Of course, a positive growth rate might be taken as evidence that a population is below its optimum. However, by any reasonable standards, the most rapidly growing populations on earth today are in general the most miserable.

This association which need not be invariable casts doubt on the optimistic assumption that the positive growth rate of a population is evidence that it has yet to reach its optimum.

We can make little progress in working toward optimum population size until we explicitly exorcize the spirit of Adam Smith in the field of practical demography. In economic affairs, The Wealth of Nations popularized the "invisible hand," the idea that an individual who "intends only his own gain," is, as it were, "led by an invisible hand to promote.

Adam Smith did not assert that this was invariably true, and perhaps neither did any of his followers. But he contributed to a dominant tendency of thought that has ever since interfered with positive action based on rational analysis, namely, the tendency to assume that decisions reached individually will, in fact, be the best decisions for an entire society.

If this assumption is correct it justifies the continuance of our present policy of laissez-faire in reproduction. If it is correct we can assume that men will control their individual fecundity so as to produce the optimum population. If the assumption is not correct, we need to reexamine our individual freedoms to see which ones are defensible.

The rebuttal to the invisible hand in population control is to be found in a scenario first sketched in a little-known pamphlet 6 in by a mathematical amateur named William Forster Lloyd We may well call it "the tragedy of the commons," using the word "tragedy" as the philosopher Whitehead used it 7: It resides in the solemnity of the remorseless working of things.

For it is only by them that the futility of escape can be made evident in the drama. The tragedy of the commons develops in this way. Picture a pasture open to all.

It is to be expected that each herdsman will try to keep as many cattle as possible on the commons. Such an arrangement may work reasonably satisfactorily for centuries because tribal wars, poaching, and disease keep the numbers of both man and beast well below the carrying capacity of the land. Finally, however, comes the day of reckoning, that is, the day when the long-desired goal of social stability becomes a reality. At this point, the inherent logic of the commons remorselessly generates tragedy.

As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain. Explicitly or implicitly, more or less consciously, he asks, "What is the utility to me of adding one more animal to my herd? Adding together the component partial utilities, the rational herdsman concludes that the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another animal to his herd.

And another; and another But this is the conclusion reached by each and every rational herdsman sharing a commons. Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit--in a world that is limited.

Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all. Some would say that this is a platitude. Would that it were! In a sense, it was learned thousands of years ago, but natural selection favors the forces of psychological denial 8. The individual benefits as an individual from his ability to deny the truth even though society as a whole, of which he is a part, suffers.

Education can counteract the natural tendency to do the wrong thing, but the inexorable succession of generations requires that the basis for this knowledge be constantly refreshed.

A simple incident that occurred a few years ago in Leominster, Massachusetts, shows how perishable the knowledge is. During the Christmas shopping season the parking meters downtown were covered with plastic bags that bore tags reading: Free parking courtesy of the mayor and city council.

Cynically, we suspect that they gained more votes than they lost by this retrogressive act. In an approximate way, the logic of the commons has been understood for a long time, perhaps since the discovery of agriculture or the invention of private property in real estate.

But it is understood mostly only in special cases which are not sufficiently generalized. Even at this late date, cattlemen leasing national land on the western ranges demonstrate no more than an ambivalent understanding, in constantly pressuring federal authorities to increase the head count to the point where overgrazing produces erosion and weed-dominance.

Likewise, the oceans of the world continue to suffer from the survival of the philosophy of the commons. Maritime nations still respond automatically to the shibboleth of the "freedom of the seas. The National Parks present another instance of the working out of the tragedy of the commons. At present, they are open to all, without limit. The parks themselves are limited in extent--there is only one Yosemite Valley--whereas population seems to grow without limit.

The values that visitors seek in the parks are steadily eroded. Plainly, we must soon cease to treat the parks as commons or they will be of no value to anyone. What shall we do? We have several options. We might sell them off as private property.

We might keep them as public property, but allocate the right to enter them. The allocation might be on the basis of wealth, by the use of an auction system. It might be on the basis of merit, as defined by some agreed-upon standards. It might be by lottery. Or it might be on a first-come, first-served basis, administered to long queues. These, I think, are all the reasonable possibilities. They are all objectionable. But we must choose--or acquiesce in the destruction of the commons that we call our National Parks.

In a reverse way, the tragedy of the commons reappears in problems of pollution. Here it is not a question of taking something out of the commons, but of putting something in--sewage, or chemical, radioactive, and heat wastes into water; noxious and dangerous fumes into the air, and distracting and unpleasant advertising signs into the line of sight.

The calculations of utility are much the same as before. The rational man finds that his share of the cost of the wastes he discharges into the commons is less than the cost of purifying his wastes before releasing them. Since this is true for everyone, we are locked into a system of "fouling our own nest," so long as we behave only as independent, rational, free-enterprisers. The tragedy of the commons as a food basket is averted by private property, or something formally like it.

But the air and waters surrounding us cannot readily be fenced, and so the tragedy of the commons as a cesspool must be prevented by different means, by coercive laws or taxing devices that make it cheaper for the polluter to treat his pollutants than to discharge them untreated.

We have not progressed as far with the solution of this problem as we have with the first. Indeed, our particular concept of private property, which deters us from exhausting the positive resources of the earth, favors pollution. The owner of a factory on the bank of a stream--whose property extends to the middle of the stream, often has difficulty seeing why it is not his natural right to muddy the waters flowing past his door. The law, always behind the times, requires elaborate stitching and fitting to adapt it to this newly perceived aspect of the commons.

The pollution problem is a consequence of population. It did not much matter how a lonely American frontiersman disposed of his waste. But as population became denser, the natural chemical and biological recycling processes became overloaded, calling for a redefinition of property rights.

Analysis of the pollution problem as a function of population density uncovers a not generally recognized principle of morality, namely: Using the commons as a cesspool does not harm the general public under frontier conditions, because there is no public, the same behavior in a metropolis is unbearable. A hundred and fifty years ago a plainsman could kill an American bison, cut out only the tongue for his dinner, and discard the rest of the animal.

He was not in any important sense being wasteful. Today, with only a few thousand bison left, we would be appalled at such behavior. In passing, it is worth noting that the morality of an act cannot be determined from a photograph.

One does not know whether a man killing an elephant or setting fire to the grassland is harming others until one knows the total system in which his act appears.

It is as tempting to ecologists as it is to reformers in general to try to persuade others by way of the photographic shortcut. But the essense of an argument cannot be photographed: That morality is system-sensitive escaped the attention of most codifiers of ethics in the past. The laws of our society follow the pattern of ancient ethics, and therefore are poorly suited to governing a complex, crowded, changeable world. Our epicyclic solution is to augment statutory law with administrative law.

Since it is practically impossible to spell out all the conditions under which it is safe to burn trash in the back yard or to run an automobile without smog-control, by law we delegate the details to bureaus.

The result is administrative law, which is rightly feared for an ancient reason-- Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? Prohibition is easy to legislate though not necessarily to enforce ; but how do we legislate temperance? Experience indicates that it can be accomplished best through the mediation of administrative law. We limit possibilities unnecessarily if we suppose that the sentiment of Quis custodiet denies us the use of administrative law.

We should rather retain the phrase as a perpetual reminder of fearful dangers we cannot avoid. The great challenge facing us now is to invent the corrective feedbacks that are needed to keep custodians honest. We must find ways to legitimate the needed authority of both the custodians and the corrective feedbacks. The tragedy of the commons is involved in population problems in another way. In a world governed solely by the principle of "dog eat dog"--if indeed there ever was such a world--how many children a family had would not be a matter of public concern.

Parents who bred too exuberantly would leave fewer descendants, not more, because they would be unable to care adequately for their children. David Lack and others have found that such a negative feedback demonstrably controls the fecundity of birds But men are not birds, and have not acted like them for millenniums, at least. If each human family were dependent only on its own resources; if the children of improvident parents starved to death; if , thus, overbreeding brought its own "punishment" to the germ line-- then there would be no public interest in controlling the breeding of families.

But our society is deeply committed to the welfare state 12 , and hence is confronted with another aspect of the tragedy of the commons. In a welfare state, how shall we deal with the family, the religion, the race, or the class or indeed any distinguishable and cohesive group that adopts overbreeding as a policy to secure its own aggrandizement 13? To couple the concept of freedom to breed with the belief that everyone born has an equal right to the commons is to lock the world into a tragic course of action.

Unfortunately this is just the course of action that is being pursued by the United Nations. In late , some 30 nations agreed to the following The Universal Declaration of Human Rights describes the family as the natural and fundamental unit of society.

It follows that any choice and decision with regard to the size of the family must irrevocably rest with the family itself, and cannot be made by anyone else. It is painful to have to deny categorically the validity of this right; denying it, one feels as uncomfortable as a resident of Salem, Massachusetts, who denied the reality of witches in the 17th century.

At the present time, in liberal quarters, something like a taboo acts to inhibit criticism of the United Nations. There is a feeling that the United Nations is "our last and best hope," that we shouldn't find fault with it; we shouldn't play into the hands of the archconservatives.

However, let us not forget what Robert Louis Stevenson said: We should also join with Kingsley Davis 15 in attempting to get Planned Parenthood-World Population to see the error of its ways in embracing the same tragic ideal. It is a mistake to think that we can control the breeding of mankind in the long run by an appeal to conscience. Charles Galton Darwin made this point when he spoke on the centennial of the publication of his grandfather's great book.

The argument is straightforward and Darwinian. Confronted with appeals to limit breeding, some people will undoubtedly respond to the plea more than others. Those who have more children will produce a larger fraction of the next generation than those with more susceptible consciences. The difference will be accentuated, generation by generation. The argument assumes that conscience or the desire for children no matter which is hereditary--but hereditary only in the most general formal sense.

The result will be the same whether the attitude is transmitted through germ cells, or exosomatically, to use A. If one denies the latter possibility as well as the former, then what's the point of education? The argument has here been stated in the context of the population problem, but it applies equally well to any instance in which society appeals to an individual exploiting a commons to restrain himself for the general good--by means of his conscience.

To make such an appeal is to set up a selective system that works toward the elimination of conscience from the race. The long-term disadvantage of an appeal to conscience should be enough to condemn it; but has serious short-term disadvantages as well. If we ask a man who is exploiting a commons to desist "in the name of conscience," what are we saying to him? What does he hear? Sooner or later, consciously or subconsciously, he senses that he has received two communications, and that they are contradictory: Everyman then is caught in what Bateson has called a "double bind.

The double bind may not always be so damaging, but it always endangers the mental health of anyone to whom it is applied.

To conjure up a conscience in others is tempting to anyone who wishes to extend his control beyond the legal limits. Leaders at the highest level succumb to this temptation. Has any President during the past generation failed to call on labor unions to moderate voluntarily their demands for higher wages, or to steel companies to honor voluntary guidelines on prices? I can recall none. The rhetoric used on such occasions is designed to produce feelings of guilt in noncooperators. For centuries it was assumed without proof that guilt was a valuable, perhaps even an indispensable, ingredient of the civilized life.

Now, in this post-Freudian world, we doubt it. Paul Goodman speaks from the modern point of view when he says: The guilty do not pay attention to the object but only to themselves, and not even to their own interests, which might make sense, but to their anxieties" One does not have to be a professional psychiatrist to see the consequences of anxiety.

We in the Western world are just emerging from a dreadful two-centuries-long Dark Ages of Eros that was sustained partly by prohibition laws, but perhaps more effectively by the anxiety-generating mechanism of education. Alex Comfort has told the story well in The Anxiety Makers 19 ; it is not a pretty one. Since proof is difficult, we may even concede that the results of anxiety may sometimes, from certain points of view, be desirable. The larger question we should ask is whether, as a matter of policy, we should ever encourage the use of a technique the tendency if not the intention of which is psychologically pathogenic.

We hear much talk these days of responsible parenthood; the coupled words are incorporated into the titles of some organizations devoted to birth control. Some people have proposed massive propaganda campaigns to instill responsibility into the nation's or the world's breeders. But what is the meaning of the word responsibility in this context? Is it not merely a synonym for the word conscience?

When we use the word responsibility in the absence of substantial sanctions are we not trying to browbeat a free man in a commons into acting against his own interest? Responsibility is a verbal counterfeit for a substantial quid pro quo. It is an attempt to get something for nothing. If the word responsibility is to be used at all, I suggest that it be in the sense Charles Frankel uses it The social arrangements that produce responsibility are arrangements that create coercion, of some sort.

The man who takes money from a bank acts as if the bank were a commons. Sex on the Beach! Skinny young french college student in stockings 18yo.

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Pascal Grousset se considère comme offensé par un article signé par le prince. En route, ils sont rejoints par Georges Sauton, journaliste au Réveil. Charles Millière et Arthur Arnould, ses amis proches. Ils décident eux aussi de se rendre à Auteuil. Une servante réceptionne les cartes. Ils pénètrent dans le salon où on les prie de patienter. Il a prétendu que les deux témoins avaient les mains dans les poches, en réalité, ils tenaient leurs chapeaux à la main.

Pascal Grousset lui tend une lettre, le prince la prend, la froisse et la pose sur un fauteuil. Dans la rue il retrouve Victor Noir qui a eut la force de sortir de la maison, il tombe sur les genoux et sur les mains. On transporte Noir chez un pharmacien voisin, le docteur Samazevilh juge Victor Noir perdu.

Il constate presque aussitôt la mort du jeune homme. Le garde des Sceaux fait arrêter et emprisonner le prince Pierre Bonaparte à la Conciergerie. Le corps de Victor Noir est déposé à Neuilly dans sa maison. Tous ses amis défilent devant sa dépouille. André Gill fait un portrait du défunt. A midi, le journal est saisi, mais trop tard, exemplaires ont été vendus.

Mais, les républicains les plus modérés: Les obsèques de Victor Noir ont lieu le 12 janvier par un temps abominable, il pleut, il fait froid. Tous les ateliers sont vides, les ouvriers ont cessé le travail. En toute logique Victor Noir doit être inhumé à Neuilly. Mais le peuple de Paris souhaite que la dépouille du jeune journaliste soit inhumée au Père Lachaise. La foule énorme, se dirige vers la demeure de Victor Noir, le peuple de Paris est là. La police estime à quatre vingt mille personnes, la foule stationnant autour de la maison du défunt.

On peut sans exagération porter ce chiffre à plus de deux cent mille personnes. Craignant des émeutes, il est interdit au cortège de pénétrer dans la capitale.

Henri Rochefort apparaît, pâle, les traits tirés. La foule insiste pour conduire le corps à Paris. Sur la fosse ouverte, Louise Michel rendra un dernier hommage a Victor Noir, elle décide ce jour là, de ne plus quitter le deuil. Le prince refuse ne se sentant pas responsable de la mort de Victor Noir. La République honore ainsi un martyr de la foi républicaine. Son tombeau est élevé par souscription nationale.

On confie à Jules Dalou, ancien élève de Carpeaux la réalisation du monument. Le monument est achevé en Cette relique, est conservée sous globe.

Le crâne fut restitué et a rejoint depuis la dépouille au Père Lachaise. You seem to be using an unsupported browser. Please update to get the most out of Flickr. Explore Trending More More. View all All Photos Tagged louise michel. Parisian Carousel by Anthony Foster. FQ9A by Francoise Gaujour. Le Nuage by Michel Craipeau. King For A Day by michel nguie. Autumn magic by Michael Buckley. Square Louise Michel Paris. Vue du square Louise Michel , Montmartre , Paris by jacques missud.

Thanks to everyone for stopping by to view, fave, and comment!! L'arbre à lettres by Robert Saucier. The grotto of love by Michael Buckley. Square Louise Michel Montmartre Paris. Eglise de Laeken - Church of Laeken by jacques freund very sick. Best to be viewed in large size format All rights reserved.

Graffitree by Robert Saucier. Wooden steps by Michael Buckley. Regard sur l'Histoire avec 2 "figures emblématiques" parmi tant d'autres de cette longue lutte contre l'oppression: Romanian postcard by Casa Filmului Acin, no. Lamoureux fongarium CMMF.

Saint-Joseph-du-Lac Basses-Laurentides , 26 juillet Consulté le 24 juillet Yves Lamoureux, 28 juillet Nepean …April Van Den Beek…..

Nepean …Cynthia Field -Rose….. Nepean …Eileen Melnick Mccarthy….. Nepean …Emma Victoria Smith….. Nepean …Jean Marie Manson….. Nepean …Jo Ann Uline….. Nepean …Leslie Da Silva….. Nepean …Lisa Marie Bambrick….. Nepean …Patrick Nicholas Smith…..

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The first is a theoretical one. It is not mathematically possible to maximize for two or more variables at the same time. This was clearly stated by von Neumann and Morgenstern 3 , but the principle is implicit in the theory of partial differential equations, dating back at least to D'Alembert The second reason springs directly from biological facts.

To live, any organism must have a source of energy for example, food. This energy is utilized for two purposes: For man, maintenance of life requires about kilocalories a day "maintenance calories".

Anything that he does over and above merely staying alive will be defined as work, and is supported by "work calories" which he takes in. Work calories are used not only for what we call work in common speech; they are also required for all forms of enjoyment, from swimming and automobile racing to playing music and writing poetry.

If our goal is to maximize population it is obvious what we must do: We must make the work calories per person approach as close to zero as possible. No gourmet meals, no vacations, no sports, no music, no literature, no art. I think that everyone will grant, without argument or proof, that maximizing population does not maximize goods. Bentham's goal is impossible. In reaching this conclusion I have made the usual assumption that it is the acquisition of energy that is the problem.

The appearance of atomic energy has led some to question this assumption. However, given an infinite source of energy, population growth still produces an inescapable problem.

The problem of the acquisition of energy is replaced by the problem of its dissipation, as J. Fremlin has so wittily shown 4.

The arithmetic signs in the analysis are, as it were, reversed; but Bentham's goal is still unobtainable. The optimum population is, then, less than the maximum. The difficulty of defining the optimum is enormous; so far as I know, no one has seriously tackled this problem. Reaching an acceptable and stable solution will surely require more than one generation of hard analytical work--and much persuasion. We want the maximum good per person; but what is good? To one person it is wilderness, to another it is ski lodges for thousands.

To one it is estuaries to nourish ducks for hunters to shoot; to another it is factory land. Comparing one good with another is, we usually say, impossible because goods are incommensurable. Incommensurables cannot be compared. Theoretically this may be true; but in real life incommensurables are commensurable. Only a criterion of judgment and a system of weighting are needed. In nature the criterion is survival. Is it better for a species to be small and hideable, or large and powerful?

Natural selection commensurates the incommensurables. The compromise achieved depends on a natural weighting of the values of the variables. Man must imitate this process. There is no doubt that in fact he already does, but unconsciously. It is when the hidden decisions are made explicit that the arguments begin. The problem for the years ahead is to work out an acceptable theory of weighting. Synergistic effects, nonlinear variation, and difficulties in discounting the future make the intellectual problem difficult, but not in principle insoluble.

Has any cultural group solved this practical problem at the present time, even on an intuitive level? One simple fact proves that none has: Any people that has intuitively identified its optimum point will soon reach it, after which its growth rate becomes and remains zero. Of course, a positive growth rate might be taken as evidence that a population is below its optimum. However, by any reasonable standards, the most rapidly growing populations on earth today are in general the most miserable.

This association which need not be invariable casts doubt on the optimistic assumption that the positive growth rate of a population is evidence that it has yet to reach its optimum. We can make little progress in working toward optimum population size until we explicitly exorcize the spirit of Adam Smith in the field of practical demography.

In economic affairs, The Wealth of Nations popularized the "invisible hand," the idea that an individual who "intends only his own gain," is, as it were, "led by an invisible hand to promote. Adam Smith did not assert that this was invariably true, and perhaps neither did any of his followers. But he contributed to a dominant tendency of thought that has ever since interfered with positive action based on rational analysis, namely, the tendency to assume that decisions reached individually will, in fact, be the best decisions for an entire society.

If this assumption is correct it justifies the continuance of our present policy of laissez-faire in reproduction. If it is correct we can assume that men will control their individual fecundity so as to produce the optimum population.

If the assumption is not correct, we need to reexamine our individual freedoms to see which ones are defensible. The rebuttal to the invisible hand in population control is to be found in a scenario first sketched in a little-known pamphlet 6 in by a mathematical amateur named William Forster Lloyd We may well call it "the tragedy of the commons," using the word "tragedy" as the philosopher Whitehead used it 7: It resides in the solemnity of the remorseless working of things.

For it is only by them that the futility of escape can be made evident in the drama. The tragedy of the commons develops in this way. Picture a pasture open to all. It is to be expected that each herdsman will try to keep as many cattle as possible on the commons. Such an arrangement may work reasonably satisfactorily for centuries because tribal wars, poaching, and disease keep the numbers of both man and beast well below the carrying capacity of the land.

Finally, however, comes the day of reckoning, that is, the day when the long-desired goal of social stability becomes a reality. At this point, the inherent logic of the commons remorselessly generates tragedy. As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain. Explicitly or implicitly, more or less consciously, he asks, "What is the utility to me of adding one more animal to my herd? Adding together the component partial utilities, the rational herdsman concludes that the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another animal to his herd.

And another; and another But this is the conclusion reached by each and every rational herdsman sharing a commons. Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit--in a world that is limited.

Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.

Some would say that this is a platitude. Would that it were! In a sense, it was learned thousands of years ago, but natural selection favors the forces of psychological denial 8. The individual benefits as an individual from his ability to deny the truth even though society as a whole, of which he is a part, suffers. Education can counteract the natural tendency to do the wrong thing, but the inexorable succession of generations requires that the basis for this knowledge be constantly refreshed.

A simple incident that occurred a few years ago in Leominster, Massachusetts, shows how perishable the knowledge is. During the Christmas shopping season the parking meters downtown were covered with plastic bags that bore tags reading: Free parking courtesy of the mayor and city council. Cynically, we suspect that they gained more votes than they lost by this retrogressive act.

In an approximate way, the logic of the commons has been understood for a long time, perhaps since the discovery of agriculture or the invention of private property in real estate. But it is understood mostly only in special cases which are not sufficiently generalized.

Even at this late date, cattlemen leasing national land on the western ranges demonstrate no more than an ambivalent understanding, in constantly pressuring federal authorities to increase the head count to the point where overgrazing produces erosion and weed-dominance.

Likewise, the oceans of the world continue to suffer from the survival of the philosophy of the commons. Maritime nations still respond automatically to the shibboleth of the "freedom of the seas. The National Parks present another instance of the working out of the tragedy of the commons.

At present, they are open to all, without limit. The parks themselves are limited in extent--there is only one Yosemite Valley--whereas population seems to grow without limit. The values that visitors seek in the parks are steadily eroded.

Plainly, we must soon cease to treat the parks as commons or they will be of no value to anyone. What shall we do? We have several options. We might sell them off as private property. We might keep them as public property, but allocate the right to enter them. The allocation might be on the basis of wealth, by the use of an auction system. It might be on the basis of merit, as defined by some agreed-upon standards.

It might be by lottery. Or it might be on a first-come, first-served basis, administered to long queues. These, I think, are all the reasonable possibilities. They are all objectionable. But we must choose--or acquiesce in the destruction of the commons that we call our National Parks.

In a reverse way, the tragedy of the commons reappears in problems of pollution. Here it is not a question of taking something out of the commons, but of putting something in--sewage, or chemical, radioactive, and heat wastes into water; noxious and dangerous fumes into the air, and distracting and unpleasant advertising signs into the line of sight.

The calculations of utility are much the same as before. The rational man finds that his share of the cost of the wastes he discharges into the commons is less than the cost of purifying his wastes before releasing them. Since this is true for everyone, we are locked into a system of "fouling our own nest," so long as we behave only as independent, rational, free-enterprisers. The tragedy of the commons as a food basket is averted by private property, or something formally like it.

But the air and waters surrounding us cannot readily be fenced, and so the tragedy of the commons as a cesspool must be prevented by different means, by coercive laws or taxing devices that make it cheaper for the polluter to treat his pollutants than to discharge them untreated. We have not progressed as far with the solution of this problem as we have with the first. Indeed, our particular concept of private property, which deters us from exhausting the positive resources of the earth, favors pollution.

The owner of a factory on the bank of a stream--whose property extends to the middle of the stream, often has difficulty seeing why it is not his natural right to muddy the waters flowing past his door. The law, always behind the times, requires elaborate stitching and fitting to adapt it to this newly perceived aspect of the commons. The pollution problem is a consequence of population.

It did not much matter how a lonely American frontiersman disposed of his waste. But as population became denser, the natural chemical and biological recycling processes became overloaded, calling for a redefinition of property rights. Analysis of the pollution problem as a function of population density uncovers a not generally recognized principle of morality, namely: Using the commons as a cesspool does not harm the general public under frontier conditions, because there is no public, the same behavior in a metropolis is unbearable.

A hundred and fifty years ago a plainsman could kill an American bison, cut out only the tongue for his dinner, and discard the rest of the animal. He was not in any important sense being wasteful. Today, with only a few thousand bison left, we would be appalled at such behavior. In passing, it is worth noting that the morality of an act cannot be determined from a photograph. One does not know whether a man killing an elephant or setting fire to the grassland is harming others until one knows the total system in which his act appears.

It is as tempting to ecologists as it is to reformers in general to try to persuade others by way of the photographic shortcut. But the essense of an argument cannot be photographed: That morality is system-sensitive escaped the attention of most codifiers of ethics in the past. The laws of our society follow the pattern of ancient ethics, and therefore are poorly suited to governing a complex, crowded, changeable world. Our epicyclic solution is to augment statutory law with administrative law.

Since it is practically impossible to spell out all the conditions under which it is safe to burn trash in the back yard or to run an automobile without smog-control, by law we delegate the details to bureaus. The result is administrative law, which is rightly feared for an ancient reason-- Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? Prohibition is easy to legislate though not necessarily to enforce ; but how do we legislate temperance?

Experience indicates that it can be accomplished best through the mediation of administrative law. We limit possibilities unnecessarily if we suppose that the sentiment of Quis custodiet denies us the use of administrative law. We should rather retain the phrase as a perpetual reminder of fearful dangers we cannot avoid.

The great challenge facing us now is to invent the corrective feedbacks that are needed to keep custodians honest. We must find ways to legitimate the needed authority of both the custodians and the corrective feedbacks. The tragedy of the commons is involved in population problems in another way.

In a world governed solely by the principle of "dog eat dog"--if indeed there ever was such a world--how many children a family had would not be a matter of public concern. Parents who bred too exuberantly would leave fewer descendants, not more, because they would be unable to care adequately for their children. David Lack and others have found that such a negative feedback demonstrably controls the fecundity of birds But men are not birds, and have not acted like them for millenniums, at least.

If each human family were dependent only on its own resources; if the children of improvident parents starved to death; if , thus, overbreeding brought its own "punishment" to the germ line-- then there would be no public interest in controlling the breeding of families.

But our society is deeply committed to the welfare state 12 , and hence is confronted with another aspect of the tragedy of the commons. In a welfare state, how shall we deal with the family, the religion, the race, or the class or indeed any distinguishable and cohesive group that adopts overbreeding as a policy to secure its own aggrandizement 13? To couple the concept of freedom to breed with the belief that everyone born has an equal right to the commons is to lock the world into a tragic course of action.

Unfortunately this is just the course of action that is being pursued by the United Nations. In late , some 30 nations agreed to the following The Universal Declaration of Human Rights describes the family as the natural and fundamental unit of society. It follows that any choice and decision with regard to the size of the family must irrevocably rest with the family itself, and cannot be made by anyone else.

It is painful to have to deny categorically the validity of this right; denying it, one feels as uncomfortable as a resident of Salem, Massachusetts, who denied the reality of witches in the 17th century. At the present time, in liberal quarters, something like a taboo acts to inhibit criticism of the United Nations.

There is a feeling that the United Nations is "our last and best hope," that we shouldn't find fault with it; we shouldn't play into the hands of the archconservatives. However, let us not forget what Robert Louis Stevenson said: We should also join with Kingsley Davis 15 in attempting to get Planned Parenthood-World Population to see the error of its ways in embracing the same tragic ideal.

It is a mistake to think that we can control the breeding of mankind in the long run by an appeal to conscience. Charles Galton Darwin made this point when he spoke on the centennial of the publication of his grandfather's great book. The argument is straightforward and Darwinian. Confronted with appeals to limit breeding, some people will undoubtedly respond to the plea more than others. Those who have more children will produce a larger fraction of the next generation than those with more susceptible consciences.

The difference will be accentuated, generation by generation. The argument assumes that conscience or the desire for children no matter which is hereditary--but hereditary only in the most general formal sense. The result will be the same whether the attitude is transmitted through germ cells, or exosomatically, to use A. If one denies the latter possibility as well as the former, then what's the point of education?

The argument has here been stated in the context of the population problem, but it applies equally well to any instance in which society appeals to an individual exploiting a commons to restrain himself for the general good--by means of his conscience. To make such an appeal is to set up a selective system that works toward the elimination of conscience from the race. The long-term disadvantage of an appeal to conscience should be enough to condemn it; but has serious short-term disadvantages as well.

If we ask a man who is exploiting a commons to desist "in the name of conscience," what are we saying to him? What does he hear? Sooner or later, consciously or subconsciously, he senses that he has received two communications, and that they are contradictory: Everyman then is caught in what Bateson has called a "double bind. The double bind may not always be so damaging, but it always endangers the mental health of anyone to whom it is applied. To conjure up a conscience in others is tempting to anyone who wishes to extend his control beyond the legal limits.

Leaders at the highest level succumb to this temptation. Has any President during the past generation failed to call on labor unions to moderate voluntarily their demands for higher wages, or to steel companies to honor voluntary guidelines on prices? I can recall none. The rhetoric used on such occasions is designed to produce feelings of guilt in noncooperators. For centuries it was assumed without proof that guilt was a valuable, perhaps even an indispensable, ingredient of the civilized life.

Now, in this post-Freudian world, we doubt it. Paul Goodman speaks from the modern point of view when he says: The guilty do not pay attention to the object but only to themselves, and not even to their own interests, which might make sense, but to their anxieties" One does not have to be a professional psychiatrist to see the consequences of anxiety.

We in the Western world are just emerging from a dreadful two-centuries-long Dark Ages of Eros that was sustained partly by prohibition laws, but perhaps more effectively by the anxiety-generating mechanism of education.

Alex Comfort has told the story well in The Anxiety Makers 19 ; it is not a pretty one. Since proof is difficult, we may even concede that the results of anxiety may sometimes, from certain points of view, be desirable.

The larger question we should ask is whether, as a matter of policy, we should ever encourage the use of a technique the tendency if not the intention of which is psychologically pathogenic. We hear much talk these days of responsible parenthood; the coupled words are incorporated into the titles of some organizations devoted to birth control. Some people have proposed massive propaganda campaigns to instill responsibility into the nation's or the world's breeders.

But what is the meaning of the word responsibility in this context? Is it not merely a synonym for the word conscience? When we use the word responsibility in the absence of substantial sanctions are we not trying to browbeat a free man in a commons into acting against his own interest?

Responsibility is a verbal counterfeit for a substantial quid pro quo. It is an attempt to get something for nothing. If the word responsibility is to be used at all, I suggest that it be in the sense Charles Frankel uses it The social arrangements that produce responsibility are arrangements that create coercion, of some sort. The man who takes money from a bank acts as if the bank were a commons. How do we prevent such action?

Certainly not by trying to control his behavior solely by a verbal appeal to his sense of responsibility. Rather than rely on propaganda we follow Frankel's lead and insist that a bank is not a commons; we seek the definite social arrangements that will keep it from becoming a commons.

That we thereby infringe on the freedom of would-be robbers we neither deny nor regret. The morality of bank-robbing is particularly easy to understand because we accept complete prohibition of this activity. We are willing to say "Thou shalt not rob banks," without providing for exceptions. But temperance also can be created by coercion. Taxing is a good coercive device. To keep downtown shoppers temperate in their use of parking space we introduce parking meters for short periods, and traffic fines for longer ones.

We need not actually forbid a citizen to park as long as he wants to; we need merely make it increasingly expensive for him to do so. Not prohibition, but carefully biased options are what we offer him.

A Madison Avenue man might call this persuasion; I prefer the greater candor of the word coercion. Coercion is a dirty word to most liberals now, but it need not forever be so. As with the four-letter words, its dirtiness can be cleansed away by exposure to the light, by saying it over and over without apology or embarrassment. To many, the word coercion implies arbitrary decisions of distant and irresponsible bureaucrats; but this is not a necessary part of its meaning.

The only kind of coercion I recommend is mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon by the majority of the people affected. To say that we mutually agree to coercion is not to say that we are required to enjoy it, or even to pretend we enjoy it. We all grumble about them. But we accept compulsory taxes because we recognize that voluntary taxes would favor the conscienceless. We institute and grumblingly support taxes and other coercive devices to escape the horror of the commons.

An alternative to the commons need not be perfectly just to be preferable. With real estate and other material goods, the alternative we have chosen is the institution of private property coupled with legal inheritance.

Is this system perfectly just? As a genetically trained biologist I deny that it is. It seems to me that, if there are to be differences in individual inheritance, legal possession should be perfectly correlated with biological inheritance--that those who are biologically more fit to be the custodians of property and power should legally inherit more. But genetic recombination continually makes a mockery of the doctrine of "like father, like son" implicit in our laws of legal inheritance.

An idiot can inherit millions, and a trust fund can keep his estate intact. We must admit that our legal system of private property plus inheritance is unjust--but we put up with it because we are not convinced, at the moment, that anyone has invented a better system. The alternative of the commons is too horrifying to contemplate. Injustice is preferable to total ruin. It is one of the peculiarities of the warfare between reform and the status quo that it is thoughtlessly governed by a double standard.

Whenever a reform measure is proposed it is often defeated when its opponents triumphantly discover a flaw in it. As Kingsley Davis has pointed out 21 , worshippers of the status quo sometimes imply that no reform is possible without unanimous agreement, an implication contrary to historical fact.

As nearly as I can make out, automatic rejection of proposed reforms is based on one of two unconscious assumptions: But we can never do nothing.

That which we have done for thousands of years is also action. It also produces evils. Once we are aware that the status quo is action, we can then compare its discoverable advantages and disadvantages with the predicted advantages and disadvantages of the proposed reform, discounting as best we can for our lack of experience.

On the basis of such a comparison, we can make a rational decision which will not involve the unworkable assumption that only perfect systems are tolerable. Perhaps the simplest summary of this analysis of man's population problems is this: As the human population has increased, the commons has had to be abandoned in one aspect after another.

First we abandoned the commons in food gathering, enclosing farm land and restricting pastures and hunting and fishing areas. These restrictions are still not complete throughout the world. Somewhat later we saw that the commons as a place for waste disposal would also have to be abandoned. Restrictions on the disposal of domestic sewage are widely accepted in the Western world; we are still struggling to close the commons to pollution by automobiles, factories, insecticide sprayers, fertilizing operations, and atomic energy installations.

In a still more embryonic state is our recognition of the evils of the commons in matters of pleasure. There is almost no restriction on the propagation of sound waves in the public medium. The shopping public is assaulted with mindless music, without its consent. Our government is paying out billions of dollars to create supersonic transport which will disturb 50, people for every one person who is whisked from coast to coast 3 hours faster.

Advertisers muddy the airwaves of radio and television and pollute the view of travelers. We are a long way from outlawing the commons in matters of pleasure. Is this because our Puritan inheritance makes us view pleasure as something of a sin, and pain that is, the pollution of advertising as the sign of virtue?

Every new enclosure of the commons involves the infringement of somebody's personal liberty. Infringements made in the distant past are accepted because no contemporary complains of a loss. It is the newly proposed infringements that we vigorously oppose; cries of "rights" and "freedom" fill the air. But what does "freedom" mean? When men mutually agreed to pass laws against robbing, mankind became more free, not less so.

Individuals locked into the logic of the commons are free only to bring on universal ruin once they see the necessity of mutual coercion, they become free to pursue other goals. I believe it was Hegel who said, "Freedom is the recognition of necessity.

The most important aspect of necessity that we must now recognize, is the necessity of abandoning the commons in breeding. No technical solution can rescue us from the misery of overpopulation.

Freedom to breed will bring ruin to all. At the moment, to avoid hard decisions many of us are tempted to propagandize for conscience and responsible parenthood.

The temptation must be resisted, because an appeal to independently acting consciences selects for the disappearance of all conscience in the long run, and an increase in anxiety in the short. The only way we can preserve and nurture other and more precious freedoms is by relinquishing the freedom to breed, and that very soon.

Only so, can we put an end to this aspect of the tragedy of the commons. M i accingo a preparare un primo piatto. Un tipico piatto ligure le cui origini risalgono ad esigenze di sopravvivenza in mare,.

Questo piatto, originario di Porto Venere, risale al secolo scorso e fu consumato fino ai primi del , tempi in cui le barche da lavoro, i minoli, i leudi, partivano per lente navigazioni, sempre costeggiando, dalla zona spezzina verso Genova o Livorno.

I marinai di tali imbarcazioni erano anche detti " gli zavorranti ", poiché i natanti, allora, avevano bisogno di una zavorra abbondante e facile da scaricare in caso di necessità. La " zavorra " consisteva in pietre di mare che venivano raccolte lungo le varie insenature del golfo e dove, spesso, i marinai catturavano anche i polpi. La permanenza in mare poteva durare anche alcune settimane e bisognava affrontare il problema del cibo in tempi in cui le tecniche di conservazione degli alimenti si affidavano a segreti tramandati da madre in figlia; si racconta che in quelle lunghe navigazioni sottocosta gli "zavorranti" gradivano molto spalmare sulle dure e saporite "gallette da marinaio" un po' di polpo che le loro mogli erano solite preparare con questa antica ricetta: Far bollire il polpo, spellarlo e poi a tocchetti batterlo in un mortaio di marmo fino a ridurlo in una pasta, alla quale si aggiungono prezzemolo, aglio, capperi del Castello tritati e fatti rosolare per alcuni minuti in olio ligure.

Una versione più moderna, invece, recita: Frullate i tentacoli con una manciatina di capperi. Mescolate la salsa aggiungendo il gin. Spalmate la salsa su dei crostini di pane. Sono andati alle banche , straniere e italiane. Oltre ai miliardi della prima, storica emorragia, altri miliardi sono semplicemente stati bruciati per il pagamento degli interessi sul debito.

E quando poi le cose sono cambiate a causa del crac finanziario, il castello è saltato. Mario Monti, Olli Rehn e Angela Merkel, continua Flammini, hanno esibito la stessa identica ricetta per vincere la sfida col debito pubblico: Gli operai compravano case anche per i figli, le famiglie facevano vacanze di un mese. Chi ci ha guadagnato, dalla inaudita tosatura degli italiani?

E quello sarebbe stato un ministro del centrosinistra? Col pareggio di bilancio inserito addirittura nella Costituzione, i circa 30 miliardi annui fin qui pagati dagli italiani saliranno a circa 90, per coprire del tutto la spesa per interessi.

E con il Fiscal Compact, il salasso salirà ancora, dal , fino a miliardi — sempre per abbattere il debito. Da qualche giorno si parla, non senza speranza, della proposta avanzata il 7 giugno da Angela Merkel alla televisione tedesca. Se non stia guadagnando tempo, dunque perdendolo. È da decenni che Parigi avversa cessioni di sovranità, e ora è messa davanti alle sue responsabilità. La rigidità francese è certo corresponsabile del presente marasma — Hollande potrebbe prendere sul serio la Merkel, costringendola a fare quel che dice di volere — ma se ascoltiamo le parole del Cancelliere e soprattutto quelle di Schäuble, ministro del Tesoro, il piano somiglia molto a un villaggio Potemkin: Il più esplicito è stato Jens Weidmann, governatore della Bundesbank.

Prima bisogna vincere la crisi: Fanno male, i piani? Sfiniscono i popoli, e aumentano perversamente i debiti nazionali? Il ministro lo nega: La domanda frana nei paesi indebitati? Anche questo viene negato: La negazione dei fatti, unita a un impressionante oblio storico come si fa, in Europa , a dire che gli scenari apocalittici non si sono mai inverati?

Se i rimedi ai vizi sono rinviati, vuol dire che non sono ritenuti farmaci cruciali. Cruciale è il giudizio dei mercati, non arginabili con un cambio di paradigma nella costruzione europea.

Cruciale è il culto del dogma, impacchettato con carta europeista in modo da imbarazzare i francesi. È quel che Walter Benjamin, in un frammento del , chiama religione del capitalismo: Non a caso, dice Benjamin, Schuld ha in tedesco due significati: La smemoratezza storica non è meno funesta. Dimentica anche quel che fu il piano Marshall, nel dopoguerra. Anche Obama, quando invita i tedeschi a crescere di più e fa capire che è in pericolo la sua rielezione, è privo di visione lunga.

Fu la messa in comune dei debiti a tramutare la costituzione confederale in Federazione. Fu per rassicurare i creditori che venne conferito alla Federazione il potere di riscuotere tasse, dandole un bilancio comune non più fatiscente. Invece di preoccuparsi dei poteri forti, Monti ha una grande opportunità: I veri poteri forti non sono in Italia. Se la Merkel non ci sta, gli Stati favorevoli si contino, nel Consiglio europeo.

Non succede il finimondo se Berlino è messa in minoranza. Il primo che in Europa farà votare su proposte serie passerà alla storia. La pubblicazione di un piccolo libro e una grande manifestazione popolare, pochi giorni fa, ci hanno messi di fronte a una domanda essenziale per la democrazia. La manifestazione sono le centinaia di migliaia di persone convenute in piazza San Giovanni a Roma, per protestare contro la legge finanziaria e soprattutto per rinnovare il carisma del leader e di nuovo esibirlo coram populo.

Un libro e una manifestazione di piazza: Among these are the playwriter Michel de Ghelderode, architects Poelaert, Balat and Suys and violinist Charles de Beriot and his wife, the famous singer known as "La Malibran".

Among the works of art decorating the tombs and chapels, the famous "Penseur" by Rodin. Jacques Brel married in this church in All my images are protected under international authors copyright laws and may not be downloaded, reproduced, copied, transmitted or manipulated without my written explicit permission. In many of his over films, he portrayed a humorously excitable, cranky man with a propensity to hyperactivity, bad faith, and uncontrolled fits of anger. Along with his short height 1.

Louis de Funès French pronunciation: Since the couple's families opposed their marriage, they settled in France in He studied at the prestigious Lycée Condorcet in Paris. He showed a penchant for tomfoolery, something which caused him trouble at school and later made it hard for him to hold down a job.

He became a pianist, working mostly as a jazz pianist at Pigalle, the famous red-light district. There he made his customers laugh each time he made a grimace. He studied acting for one year at the Simon acting school. It proved to be a waste of time except for his meeting with actor Daniel Gélin, who would become a close friend. In , they divorced. During the occupation of Paris in the Second World War, he continued his piano studies at a music school, where he fell in love with a secretary, Jeanne Barthelémy de Maupassant, a grandniece of the famous author Guy de Maupassant.

They married in and remained together for forty years, until de Funès' death in The pair had two sons: Patrick and Olivier Patrick became a doctor who now practices in Saint-Germain en Laye.

Olivier later worked as an aviator for Air France Europe. Through the early 's, Louis de Funès continued playing piano at clubs, thinking there wasn't much call for a short, balding, skinny actor. His wife and Daniel Gélin encouraged him to overcome his fear of rejection. De Funès began his show business career in the theatre, where he enjoyed moderate success.

For the next ten years, de Funès would appear in fifty films, but always in minor roles, usually as an extra, scarcely noticed by the audience. In the meanwhile he pursued a theatrical career. Even after he attained the status of film star, he continued to play theatre. His stage career culminated in a magnificent performance in the play Oscar, a role which he would later reprise in the film version of During this period, De Funès developed a pattern of daily activities: This success film guaranteed de Funès top billing in all of his subsequent films.

Between and , Louis de Funès topped France's box-office of the year's most successful films seven times. At the age of 49, De Funès unexpectedly became a superstar with the international success of two films. Tropez , Jean Girault with Michel Galabru. After their first successful collaboration on Pouic-Pouic, director Girault had perceived de Funès as the ideal actor to play the part of the accident prone gendarme. The film lead to a series of six 'Gendarme' films. It remains his greatest success.

De Funès played a bigoted Frenchman who finds himself forced to impersonate a popular rabbi while on the run from a group of assassins.

The Crocodile project was canceled. After his recovery, Louis de Funès collaborated with Claude Zidi, in a departure from his usual image. He played a well-known gourmet and publisher of a famous restaurant guide, who is waging a war against fast food entrepreneur. It was a new character full of nuances and frankness and arguably the best of his roles.

Unlike the characters he played, de Funès was said to be a very shy person in real life. He became a knight of France's Légion d'honneur in He resided in the Château de Clermont, a 17th-century monument, located in the commune of Le Cellier, which is situated near Nantes in France.

In his later years, he suffered from a heart condition after having suffered a heart attack caused by straining himself too much with his stage antics. Louis de Funès died of a massive stroke in , a few months after making Le Gendarme et les gendarmettes.

He was laid to rest in the Cimetière du Cellier, the cemetery situated in the grounds of the château. His many films bear testimony to the extent of his comic genius and demonstrate the tragedy that he never earned the international recognition that he certainly deserved. Basidiome de taille moyenne, chapeau mat, multicolore, lames jaunâtres à maturité, lamellules absentes, pied blanc, rougissant puis noircissant au contact, sporée jaune orangé pâle F-G , saveur douce.

Estival, lié à Quercus et Fagus. CHAPEAU atteignant 4 10 cm, globuleux, convexe puis étalé-déprimé, viscidule, vite sec et mat, de coloration variable, panaché, brun et jaune, jaune et violet, rouge vif à rouge pourpré et taché de jaunâtre, parfois avec des plages olivacées, à marge courtement striée-tuberculeuse à maturité.

LAMES adnées, serrées, plutôt larges, cassantes, non fourchues, blanchâtres, jaunissant avec l'âge; lamellules absentes ou très rares. PIED atteignant 10 x 0, 2,5 cm, égal ou régulièrement élargi vers le bas, ferme puis cassant-spongieux, plein puis farci, à revêtement glabre, finement strié, blanc, parfois taché de brun à la base, rougissant puis noircissant au grattage, entièrement gris-noir après dessiccation.

CHAIR blanche, assez ferme puis fragile, cassante, lentement rougi-noircissante à la cassure, grisâtre dans la vétusté. Après dessiccation, un montage fait directement fait dans la sulfovanilline ne permet pas de voir les hyphes incrustées facilement.

On peut les observer plus aisément dans le bleu de crésyl formule publiée par Buyck, op. Distribution suivant probablement celle de ses partenaires symbiotiques. Quelques années plus tard, dans sa monographie des russules de la Caroline du Nord , il inclut son espèce sans en modifier la description.

Étrangement, malgré des différences majeures dans la coloration du chapeau, il choisit de ne pas décrire une nouvelle espèce. Les photos de Matthieu Sicard, sur sa galerie FlickR, le montrent bien. Mais je dirais que les chapeaux rouge vif ne se rencontrent que chez un ou deux basidiomes sur dix, tous les autres étant rouge vineux foncé ou multicolores.

Le taxon de Beardslee et celui de Kauffman désignent-ils la même espèce? Impossible de répondre à ces questions pour le moment. Il faut savoir que Roger Phillips et Geoffrey Kibby travaillaient souvent ensemble dans les années La photo dans Phillips illustre trois basidiomes qui correspondent assez bien à la description originale de Beardslee les trois sont entièrement rouges. La description dans Kibby et Fatto concorde avec celle de Phillips.

Autre question sans réponse. Quant à McNeil , il choisit simplement de suivre Kauffman. Sa photo illustre une russule à chapeau pourpre violet.

Il m'a promptement répondu: Ce qui suggère que cette russule serait non décrite. En conclusion, on ne saurait considérer l'espèce ci-dessus comme nouvelle avec certitude. Chapeau vite sec et mat, rouge vif à pourpre vineux, panaché de brun, de jaune, de violet ou de vert olive. FATTO, 3e éd. Pyrénées Méditerranéennes, Perpignan, p.

Michel Quintin, Montréal, p. Consulté le 20 juillet For the 5 kilometre race results and photos I understand that this site is not an offer for prostitution.

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